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Language and the 
Play of 
Differences 
Robert E. Innis 
Review-essay on Umberto Eco, Se111iotics and the Philosophy of Language. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984. 
Umberto Eco's recent book lies at the point of intersection of 
two semiotic trajectories and pursues-through seven interrelated 
studies on 'signs,' 'dictionary vs. encyclopedia,' 'metaphor,' 'sym-
bol,' 'code,' 'isotopy,' and 'mirrors'-"the capital question of any 
philosophy of language: what does it mean for human. beings to 
say, to express meanings, to convey ideas, or to mention states 
of the world?" (7). It combines the fundamentally inferential or 
abductive definition of Peirce that a sign is "something which 
stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity" 
(CP 2.228)-a definition which foregrounds the five factors of 
semiosis: sign, interpreter, interpretant, object, ground-with the 
differential concept of the sign deriving from Saussure and 
Hjelmslev. The Peircean trajectory leads to the thesis of unlimited 
semiosis, to Eco's greater proximity, in spite of many of his exam-
ples, to philosophical rather than literary issues, to his focussing 
upon signification rather than communication, and hence to his 
fundamentally cognitive approach to signs as representational de-
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vices. The Saussurian and Hjelmslevian trajectory leads to Eco's 
opposition to any attempts to reify signs and to his central thesis 
on signs as labile sign-functions, to the consequent nomadism of 
semiosis as interpretive activity, to the foregrounding of the matrix 
of oppositions and differences within which semiosis is located, 
and hence to a field or objective theory of semiosis as such which 
decenters the sign-producing and interpreting subject, but in a 
way rather different from certain strands of French work with 
which, nevertheless, there is a certain affinity. 
One of Eco's primary goals is to dismantle the formal theory 
of meaning that has guided much contemporary semantic theory 
and that is the source of many of its 'cramps' (46). Underlying 
the drive toward a formal theory of meaning, Eco argues, is the 
picture of meaning as formalized in a dictionary or in a Porphyrian 
tree as the paradigmatic focus of semantic space where all the 
routes between signifying items would be able to be rigidly and 
hierarchically charted and ordered. Implied in the hierarchical 
structure of the Porphyrian tree is the necessity of a finite number 
of semantic markers that delimit one semantic unit from another. 
Unlimited semiosis, however, the unlimited chain of interpretants 
that signs give rise to and that effect the play of differences in the 
content continuum, looks upon any ordering or systematization 
of semantic markers as merely local and transitory concretions of 
the global encyclopedia that makes up the knowledge system of 
any culture at any particular time. 
In an ingenious argument concerning the role of differences 
in the Porphyrian semantic universe and representational schema, 
Eco points out that the logical theory embodied in such an image 
is exploded when we recognize the role of differentiae in specifying 
the genera and species which make up the nodes in the tree. 
"Genera and species are only the names that we assign to the 
nodes represented by disjunctions of differentiae" (65). In fact, 
"the tree is entirely made up with differentiae" (65). "Genera and 
species are linguistic ghosts that cover the real nature of the tree 
and of the universe it represents: a world of pure differentiae" 
(65-66). More apocalyptically: "The tree of genera and species, the 
tree of substances, blows up in a dust of differentiae, in a turmoil 
of infinite accidents, in a nonhierarchical network of qualia. The 
dictionary is dissolved into a potentially unordered and unre-
stricted galaxy of pieces of world knowledge. The dictionary thus 
becomes an encyclopedia, because it was in fact a disguised ency-
clopedia" (68). 
The heart of Eco's semiotic project is Peirce's contention that 
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"a sign is something by knowing which we know something 
more." Using this dictum as his heuristic clue, Eco is able to take 
dead aim at the primarily linguistically induced equivalence or 
identity model of the sign and of sign processes according to 
which the meaning of a sign is some unified whole captured in 
equivalent signs and encapsulated in a dictionary and all guaran-
teed by some sort of super-subject. Instead sign-systems, the ul-
timate foundations of our apprehension of significant units in the 
experiential flow, are without a stable center, resembling (being) 
labyrinths, rhizomes, clusters of sign functions and content 
nebulae, and so forth. Eco wants to show that signification is a 
continuous process or chain of inferential acts, based on compli-
cated relations of implication and correlation between the two 
components of a sign-function-the expression plane and the con-
tent plane-that have no substantive or extra-semiotic reality or 
foundation. Their reality is that of a coded relation, of a set of 
differential oppositions in the expressive medium or in the content 
continuum, both of which are 'cut' or 'segmented' in the articula-
tory process. This cutting is, in the case of external signs, not a 
private act but a social process that takes on a stable, extra-subjec-
tive form, as distillates of socially encoded acts of sense-giving 
and sense-reading, to which the linguistic subjects submit and 
that brings into play and into relation functional units of opposi-
tion. In this way Eco is able to wed successfully the Peircean 
theme of infinite semiosis and the indefinite chain of interpretants 
to which all sign functions give rise with the Saussurian and 
Hjelmslevian theme of the play of differences. 
The cutting of the expression and content planes is for Eco a 
pure play of differences, and in this he continues, without, how-
ever, fully exploiting its implications, the development of the great 
phonological model and the model of the sign built on it espied 
by Saussure, developed by Buhler, Trubetzkoy, and Hjelmslev, 
and widely exploited, with unclear results, by the French struc-
turalists. Both the differential theory of sign constitution and the 
inferential model of the sign stemming from the Stoics and more 
recently from Peirce entail that signs are not ontologically special 
types of objects but only perceptible things which are 'taken' as 
signs. This is ultimately a process of coding, which is labile and 
historically variable. As an attack on the possibility of, and an 
effective dismantling of, a formal theory of meaning, with its 
underlying model of the dictionary, Eco is certainly right, and he 
continues, in the semiotic key, the paradigmatic, if fragmented, 
work of Wittgenstein. 
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Wittgenstein's primary intention was to destroy once and for 
all the search for a certain cognitive touchstone upon which our 
intercourse with the world could be based, and he constantly 
adduced parallels and differences between linguistic and percep-
tual forms of apprehension. In the semiotic framework the relation 
of the expression plane to the content plane, the relation of signifier 
to signified, is always, in one way or the other, coded and hence 
'arbitrary.' Articulate systems, however, still have to be applied 
or fitted to the world of experience, where things are mentioned 
through referential acts. The epistemological and criteria! prob-
lems of how the content units and the experiential units are related 
to one another is not subsumable, strictly speaking, under the 
rubric of coding, for there has to be some 'fit,' no matter how we 
understand it, between the sign, as the indissoluble union of 
signifier and signified, and the object domain upon which it bears. 
While Wittgenstein both tried to uncover the 'grammar of percep-
tual takings' and to reconcile his 'phenomenological' findings with 
his famous thesis that "grammar tells us what kind of thing an 
object is," and thus was forced to try to specify, fundamentally 
through the notion of a form of life, how the 'grammatical' and 
the 'perceptual' were to be related, Eco runs the risk, as do in fact 
his French parallels, of leaving the two systems free-floating, in-
dependently of one another. 
Now we have to admit that the 'arbitrariness' of sign-systems 
over against experience is not absolute. Just as sign systems are 
composed of a vast array of pertinent features, on both the expres-
sion and content planes, so perception itself, the ultimate ground 
or field of semiosis, is guided by a parallel process of pertinenti-
zation. A perceptual object is for us a fusion of pertinent features 
that are encapsulated in the categorial system borne by the expres-
sion system and those pertinent features which are resident in the 
material structures of the sensory array itself. 'Knuckle fat' 
(Danish) and 'elbow grease' (English) (to take an example supplied 
by my bilingual wife) 'cut' the perceptual continuum differently 
and constitute two different 'focal objects.' Pertinentization is 
learned by assimilation of articulate semantic markers that belong 
to the encyclopedic knowledge and competence of a particular 
linguistic culture and to the natural lines and contours resident in 
the perceptual field itself. Perceptually pertinent in the perceptual 
field is either the knuckle in contact or the moving elbow. The 
foregrounding of one rather than the other is due to the !ability 
of perception itself and not to the extrinsic application of an already 
structured and ready-made sign-system to the perceptual con-
tinuum. 
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The perceptual continuum in fact is subject to certain laws of 
self-organization which strictly delimit the range of possible cut-
tings, although the explicitly semiosic processes of interpretation 
are underdetermined by experience itself. Pre-existing sign sys-
tems and systems of meaning 'motivate' our conception of the 
'play of differences' in the perceptual field, while the actual play 
of differences in perception display Gestalt characteristics such as 
pregnance, good form, closure, and so forth, which, in fact, as 
Rene Thom has shown in the application of his catastrophe theory 
to semiotics, are also the characteristics of those special types of 
objects called 'signs.' 
The problem is to see what an interpretation of perception in 
strictly semiotic terms would look like. This Eco simply does not 
supply, or even attempt to foreground, although elements for it 
lie ready to hand in the model of sign processes that he has 
adopted and in his occasional comments, both in the present book 
and in his A Theory of Semiotics, on the parallels between 'meaning' 
in the linguistic and perceptual realms. For instance, in his discus-
sion of 'mirrors' we find Eco saying that from an ontogenetic point 
of view "we are not sure whether semiosis is at the basis of per-
ception or vice versa (and, therefore, whether semiosis is at the 
basis of thought or vice versa)" (203). Paradoxically, had Eco seen 
the heuristic implications of his own model of sign processes he 
would have proceeded rather differently, for example, modifying 
his account of metaphor, which displays his own position on the 
issue of the semiotic closure. 
The point of connection to this problem-area is the phonolog-
ical model itself. Phonology points directly to our powers of ve-
ridical abstraction in grasping the diacritical moments of produced 
forms, and the distinction between phones and phonemes bears 
witness to this abstractive power, our power to grasp ideal struc-
tures in the phonic flow, giving us sign-types which are realized 
by sign-tokens. Diacrisis is dependent upon differential moments 
in the phonic flow which are objective and coded. Perception is 
dependent upon differential moments in the experiential flow 
which are the analoga to phonemes and to Gestalt characteristics. 
These differential moments are objective, but only partially coded, 
and no sign-system could function which did not intersect with 
the 'significant joints' drawn in the experiential continuum, the 
problem of Plato's Theatetus. 
The penetration of the inferential model of semiosis into an 
account of the semiotic structure of perception would have made 
Eco's program much stronger. Perception wouid be shown in 
principle to be semiotic or semiosic if the 'standing-for' relation-
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ship, the stare pro quo relationship, could be shown to be instan-
tiated in perceptual processes quite generally. In the Peircean 
formulation, indexes are existentially connected with their objects. 
There is a real bond between them and their objects but the bond 
b~comes semiotically relevant when it is stipulated by a process 
akin to coding. A semiotic model of perception would have to 
consider as indexes the real parts or traces of the object which are 
seen to point to, in a rule-governed fashion, their organizing 
ground of unity, the focal object on which they bear. The object 
itself would not be something separate from the perceptual in-
dexes, which are in fact its particulars, but the figure drawn by 
the indexes in the field of consciousness. The coded aspect of 
perception (in the soft version of code, chapter 5) would arise 
from our grasp of types, of systematic correlations between differ-
ent sets of indexes and the same types of objects whenever they 
appear in the field of consciousness itself. Coding in this case is 
the equivalent of our reading of natural signs. Perceptual particu-
lars are natural signs of their objects which are their meanings : 
Polanyi's physiognostic meanings. 
On this position meaning-object and the standing-for relation 
arise from an interpretative act which only seems immediate be-
cause it has now become habituated. The inferential labor of per-
ception consists, in fact, of abducing the rule-which is the ob-
ject-which binds the particulars, as indexes, together into a unity. 
A face is known only through its features which mean it and 
which are real parts of it. A melodic pattern is known only through 
the linear seriation of tonal particulars which point to their prin-
ciple of completion, the melody itself. A probe or stick purveys 
to us indexes of what it itself is in contact with and is itself an 
index: it, and the tactile particulars mediated by its material reality, 
must be construed by the perceiving subject. The closing of the 
logical gap, in Polanyi's sense, between sensory particulars and 
the focal whole is then an act of interpretation, a 'taking,' although 
it is clear from the psychology of perception, especially Gestalt 
theory, that non-semiosic factors are also determinative in the 
grasp of the object. 
Eco's account of metaphor, which is in itself a solid and in-
sightful contribution to this topic, also raises questions concerning 
the constitutive role of varying semiotic factors and levels in the 
genesis of sense and meaning. Eco has already argued in "The 
Semantics of Metaphor" (in The Role of the Reader) that metaphoric 
expressions fundamentally institute and do not merely record a 
semantic connection between already existing items in the global 
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semantic field and that metaphor rests on the maze of possible 
connections between items which the keen linguistic conscious-
ness is able to discern. He ignores, however, the inferential labor 
of grasping perceptual 'original resemblances' which, while cer-
tainly heuristically guided by pre-existing expression systems, is 
also rooted in the inferential labor of perception which grasps 
structural, figural, and functional continuities and differences in 
the experiential flow. The creative metaphorical twist has to follow 
certain lines that manifest perceptually verifiable properties, which 
are, admittedly, formulated in the system of semantic markers. 
However, the chain of interpretants which signs give rise to can 
also be a chain of perceptual interpretants, of iconic 'resemblances' 
which are 'read out of' experience and not merely 'read into' it. 
The fusion and translation of semes within the realm of linguistic 
metaphor raises the whole thorny issue of 'perceptual semes.' 
For it is undeniable, as Karl Buhler argued, that a primary 
analogue to metaphor as the predominant linguistic 'trope' is to 
be found in the peculiar characteristics of binocular vision that 
are fundamentally 'abstractive.' The fusion of two images into one 
viewed object in binocular vision parallels the fusion of two (or 
more) semantic spaces (which Buhler represents by a superimpo-
sition of lattice-structures) that takes place in metaphorical ap-
prehension and denotation. Eco does not speak of fusion and he 
makes no appeal to perceptual analogies. For him metaphor is 
primarily, if not exclusively, a linguistic phenomenon. The original 
generation of the signifying units, many of which are themselves 
already metaphorical (Quintilian: paene omne dictum metaphora est), 
is taken as a given and the adjustment of the novel sense, effected 
through a metonymic process, takes place through an exchange 
of semes, of semantic markers, which migrate from one conceptual 
space to another. This migration, I think, however, must always 
be governed by what Alan Gardiner (in The Theory of Speech and 
Language) called 'the thing-meant,' for otherwise we would have 
no control over the 'appositeness' of our articulation. 
It is true that a consciousness embodied in a pre-given set of 
expressions will be guided to articulate the world in light of it and 
that this expression system will have a complex internal structure 
that allows it to be split and to set up new combinations. The 
tendency in Eco's general procedure is to try to eliminate all traces 
of motivation in the generation of systems of sign functions so 
that they have a fundamentally autonomous and constitutive role 
over against the experiential field. It is the significant cuts in the 
content continuum, which is a system of meanings, that filter the 
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significant cuts in this field. However, the use of a system of 
contents, as filters, to mention states of affairs in the world raises 
criteria! problems of epistemology that Eco does not adequately 
confront. For what ultimately constrains the generation of sign 
functions? Why do systems of expressions, and their correspond-
ing contents, seem to fit experience, to work? A satisfactory answer 
to these questions would take us deep into the theory of judgment 
and evidence and into a further exploration of the intimate connec-
tions between perceptual apprehension and all the constitutive 
conditions to which it is subject. 
Culture puts, it is certainly true, a transitory and provisional 
frame around the otherwise disordered turmoil of accidents, which 
is 'the world.' But once again, however, the issue of just how 
labile the clusters of differences are raises its head. Culture pro-
duces a vast array of contexts, topics, frames, scripts, stereotypes, 
commonsense knowledge, and so forth which mediate experience 
and sort it. The sorting is never a definitive one and the criteria 
according to which the segmentation takes place are rooted in 
subjective and objective factors that combine in numerous, but 
not totally arbitrary, ways. While to be sure linguistic systems are 
not merely reproductive of what lies ready to hand in the experien-
tial field, being in fact selective and abstractive abbreviations that 
light up significant differences within the perceptual world, they 
must intersect at 'relevant' points with the lines of demarcation 
in the perceptually accessible world of objects. 
Expression systems register differences as well as constitute 
them. Semantic fields exist that are not isomorphic with others 
which bear upon the same 'object domain' because, in fact, the 
object domain itself is intrinsically labile. Still, mercilessly exploit-
ing the Hjelmslevian thesis on the forms of content and the vari-
ability of the segmentation process, it is for the most part the 
!ability of the expression systems that is foregrounded in Eco's 
argument. Semiosis in external sign-systems has, to be sure, no 
fixed or stable boundaries, but semiosis in internal sign-systems, 
the 'internal signs' of consciousness itself, takes place through a 
peculiar fusion of external and internal systems. The heuristic 
fertility of a sign-system with respect to perception is well known, 
but Eco runs the risk of making his semiotic philosophy of lan-
guage top-heavy-oriented around 'texts' and their meanings-
and hence falling into a form of nominalism and even of decon-
structionism, assimilating himself willy-nilly to "the new atheistic 
mystics of the godless drift" (156). 
Linguistic systems are, I think, best thought of as matrices 
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that guide perception and fuse with it. It is their very transparency 
that makes the world seen with their aid seem so 'natural.' But 
the generation of significant experiential harmonies is dependent 
upon the mutual adjustment of interpretive demands emanating 
from the expression system and from the play of differences in 
the experiential continuum itself. Experience gives us figures 
which emerge out of the continuous flow of qualia. These figures 
are systems of differences and hence an object is the name we 
give to that complex of perceptual differences that inscribe them-
selves on the field of consciousness. While a concept is a rule for 
bringing the manifold of intuition into a unity, there are properly 
perceptual categories that aid and mediate this process of synthe-
sis. These categories, and the operations and matrices in which 
they are embodied, have been charted by perceptual theory and 
the task that now faces us, in light of Eco's fine and masterful 
defense of the play of differences in language, is to complete in 
detail the reformulation of the whole set of problems he has raised 
by making the circle of semiosis "where it would be difficult to 
spot a starting point" not just a postulate but the object of a 
nuanced phenomenology of semiosis in all its domains. In short, 
we still need to understand, from the semiotic point of view, the 
peculiar dialectic between form and meaning in perception and 
to sort out their various contributions before we can determine 
just how semiosis is ultimately a closed circle and how the play 
of signs, which is a play of differences, can be seen in all the 
forms of consciousness. Only then will we be able to complete 
the investigations collected in this book in the direction toward 
which they are so obviously heading. 
